Questions: 4 Eros in Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium and Socrates in his Charmides, with a reference to his Phaedo

In the Charmides Socrates suggests that the knowledge of the good and bad alone makes a man do well and achieve happiness: ‘Because (Epei), Critias (ô Kritia), if it’s your intention (ei etheleis) to remove (exelein) that knowledge (tautên tên epistêmên) from the other knowledges (ek tôn allôn epistêmôn), will medicine make us healthy any the less (hêtton ti hê men iatrikê hugiainein poiêsei); shoemaking make shoes any the less (hê de skutikê hupodedesthai); weaving make clothes any the less (hê de huphantikê êmphiesthai)? Will piloting prevent death at sea any the less (hê de kubernêtikê kôlusei en tê̢ thalattê̢ apothnê̢skein), or generalship death in war (kai hê stratêgikê en polemô̢;)?’ – Critias: ‘No (Ouden hêtton).’ – S. ‘But (All’), my dear Critias (ô phile Kritia), we’ll be unable to ensure that each of these performed well and beneficially (to eu ge toutôn hekasta gignesthai kai ôphelimôs apoleloipos hêmas estai) if that knowledge is absent (tautês apousês).’ – C. ’That’s true (Alêthê legeis).’ – S. ‘But it would appear that that knowledge isn’t sôphrosunê [D.Watt ’self-control’] (Ouch hautê de ge, hôs eoiken, estin hê sôphrosunê), but rather the knowledge whose function is to benefit us (all’ hês ergon estin to ôphelein hêmas). It’s not the knowledge of knowledges and ignorances (ou gar epistêmôn ge kai anepistêmosunôn hê epistêmê estin), but of good (alla agathou ge) and bad (kai kakou); so that (hôste) if that knowledge is beneficial (ei hautê estin ôphelimos), our sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] must be something else (hê sôphrosunê allo ti an eiê hêmin).’ – C. ‘Why (Ti d’) wouldn’t sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] benefit us (ouk an hautê ôpheloi;)? If sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] is in the fullest sense the knowledge of knowledges and presides over the other knowledges too (ei gar hoti malista tôn epistêmôn epistêmê estin hê sôphrosunê), it would certainly govern the knowledge of the good too and consequently benefit us (epistatei ge kai tais allais epistêmais, kai tautês dêpou an archousa tês peri t’agathon epistêmês ôpheloi an hêmas).’

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Critias initially spoke of ‘the knowledge of good and bad’ (174b10), but at this point he speaks of the same knowledge as the knowledge ‘of the good’ (peri t’agathon). This ‘slip’ is not trivial. In the Phaedo Socrates says that ‘On this theory, then (ek de dê tou logou toutou), a man should consider nothing else (ouden allo skopein prosêkein anthrôpô̢), whether in regard to himself or anything else (kai peri autou ekeinou kai tôn allôn), but the best (all’ ê to ariston), the highest good (kai beltiston); though the same man must also know the worse (anankaion de einai ton auton touton kai to cheiron eidenai), as they are objects of the same knowledge (tên autên gar einai epistêmên peri autôn). (97d1-5, tr. David Gallop)

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Socrates: ‘Would it make us healthy too (Ê k’an hugiainein poioi), not medicine (all’ ouch hê iatrikê;)? Would it make the products of the other arts (kai t’alla ta tôn technôn hautê an poioi), instead of each of them making its own (kai ouch hai allai to hautês ergon hekastê;)? Weren’t we solemnly declaring all this time (ê ou palai diemarturometha) that it was knowledge only of knowledge and ignorance (hoti epistêmês monon estin kai anepistêmosunês epistêmê) and nothing else (allou de oudenos)?’ Isn’t that so (ouch houtô;)?’ – C. ‘Apparently (Phainetai ge).’ – S. ‘So it wouldn’t be the producer of health (Ouk ara hugieias estai dêmiourgos;)? – C. ‘Certainly not (Ou dêta).’ – S. ‘Because health belonged to another art (Allês gar ên technês hugieia), didn’t it (ê ou;)?’ – C. ‘Yes (Allês).’ – S. ‘So it won’t be the producer of benefit either (Oud’ ara ôphelias), my friend (ô hetaire), since we allocated that product to another art (allê̢ gar au apedomen touto to ergon technê̢) a minute ago (nundê), didn’t we (ê gar;)?’ – C. ‘Yes, certainly (Panu ge).’ – S. ‘How will sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] be beneficial, then (Pôs oun ôphelimos estai hê sôphrosunê), when it is the producer of no benefit (oudemias ôphelias ousa dêmiourgos;)? – C. ‘It won’t at all (Oudamôs), it would appear, Socrates (ô Sôkrates, eoiken ge).’ (174c3-175a8, tr. D. Watt)

The knowledge of the good thus becomes a stumbling block that stands in the way of defining sôphrosunê, which Socrates professes to be unable to overcome: ‘Do you see (Hora̢s oun), Critias (ô Kritia), how all this time I had good reason to be apprehensive (hôs egô palai eikotôs ededoikê), and was quite right to accuse myself (kai dikaiôs emauton ê̢tiômên) of not conducting a worthwhile inquiry into sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] (hoti ouden chrêston peri sôphrosunês skopô;)? Something that is agreed to be the most admirable of all things wouldn’t have seemed to us to be of no benefit (ou gar an pou ho ge kalliston pantôn homologeitai einai touto hêmin anôpheles ephanê) if I had been any use at making a proper investigation (ei ti emou ophelos ên pros to kalôs zêtein). As it is now (nun de), we’re defeated on all fronts (pantachê̢ gar hêttômetha), and are unable to discover (kai ou dunametha heurein) to which actual thing (eph’ hô̢ pote tôn ontôn) the lawgiver (ho nomothetês) gave the name of sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] (touto t’ounoma etheto, tên sôphrosunên). And yet (kaitoi) we have conceded many points (polla sunkechôrêkamen) which did not follow (ou sumbainonth’ hêmin) from our argument (en tô̢ logô̢). We conceded that there was a knowledge of knowledge (kai gar epistêmên epistêmês einai sunechôrêsamen), although the argument denied it (ouk eôntos tou logou) and claimed there wasn’t (oude phaskontos einai). We conceded that this knowledge knew the products of the other knowledges too (kai tautê̢ au tê̢ epistêmê̢ kai ta tôn allôn epistêmôn erga gignôskein sunechôrêsamen) although the argument denied this as well (oude touto eôntos tou logou), just to have the sôphrôn [D.W. ’self-controlled man’] in possession of the knowledge (hina dê hêmin genoito ho sôphrôn epistêmôn) that he knows (ho te oiden) what he knows (ho ti oiden) and that he does not know what he does not know (kai hôn mê oiden hoti ouk oiden). We made that terribly generous concession (touto men dê kai pantapasi megaloprepôs sunechôrêsamen) without even considering (oud’ episkepsamenoi) the impossibility (to adunaton einai) of a man knowing in some sort of way what he does not know at all (ha tis mê oiden mêdamôs, tauta eidenai hamôs ge pôs); for we allowed that he knows what he does not know (ho ti gar ouk oiden, phêsin auta eidenai hê hêmetera homologia), and yet (kaitoi) I think (hôs egô̢mai) nothing would seem stranger than that (oudenos hotou alogôteron tout’ an phaneiê). All the same (all’ homôs), although the investigation has found us so very good-natured (houtôs hêmôn euêthikôn tuchousa hê zêtêsis) and compliant (kai ou sklêrôn), it has still been no more able to discover the truth (ouden ti mallon heurein dunatai tên alêtheian), but has made such sport of it (alla tosouton kategelasen autês) as to demonstrate to us quite brutally the uselessness of sôphrosunê [D.W. ’self-control’] as we defined it in those fictions we agreed on for so long (hôste ho hêmeis palai sunomologountes kai sumplattontes etithemetha sôphrosunên einai, touto hêmin panu hubristikôs anôpheles on apephaine).’ (175a9-d5, tr. D. Watt)

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At 174a4-6 Socrates presents a positive picture of a man endowed with sôphrosunê: ‘Can it be that you mean the kind of man (ara mê ton toionde) who knows all the past and present in addition to the future (ei tis pros tois mellousin kai ta gegonota panta eideiê kai ta nun onta), and is ignorant of nothing (kai mêden agnooi;)? Let’s assume that such a man exists (thômen gar tina einai auton).’ Then he asks Critias: ‘Which of the knowledges is it that makes him happy (tis auton tôn epistêmôn poiei eudaimona; tr. D. Watt)?’

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The English term ‘happy’ is the most unfortunate term in rendering the meaning of eudaimôn, for it suggests something felt subjectively – I always think of the song ‘don’t worry, be happy’ – whereas the Greek term eudaimôn suggests a general well-being, of which one’s feeling to be happy is only a part. This aspect of eudaimonia comes to the fore when Socrates takes stock of Critias’ answer that it is the knowledge of good and bad that is most conducive to it. Socrates: ‘It is not the life according to knowledge (ou to epistêmonôs ên zên) which makes men act rightly and be happy (to eu prattein te kai eudaimonein poioun), not even if it be knowledge of all the other sciences (oude sumpasôn tôn allôn epistêmôn), but one science only (alla mias ousês tautês monon), that of good and evil (tês peri to agathon te kai kakon).’ (174b12-c3, tr. Jowett)

Here again, Jowett’s ‘act rightly and be happy’ suggests ‘acting rightly’ and ‘being happy’ as two different things: one ‘acts rightly’ and as a consequence ‘is happy’. But in Greek to eu prattein is almost synonymous with kai eudaimonein; both are verbs, both express life-activities taken in the totality of one’s life.

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Clearly, Socrates has a very strong view of the knowledge of good and bad, although he speaks of it as ‘my dream’ (to emon onar, 173a7). This knowledge can’t be intended to be viewed just as a stumbling block, as which it ultimately functions within the framework of the Charmides; it points over the head of the not-knowing Socrates, transcending the dialogue. Can Diotima’s speech in the Symposium enlighten us on this point?

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After depicting the world in which Eros, who always loses what he has gained, operates, the world in which even the sciences are subjected to generation and decay (Symp. 207d-208a), Diotima points to an entirely different science/knowledge, which is of beauty itself, free from change. Can the science/knowledge of the good in the Charmides be seen in the light of Diotima’s science/knowledge of the beauty itself?

In Diotima’s narrative the world of change is related to beauty itself: A philosopher, guided by Eros, ‘turned towards the vast sea of beauty (epi to polu pelagos tetrammenos tou kalou) and contemplating it (kai theôrôn), will give birth to many beautiful and noble discourses (pollous kai kalous logous kai megaloprepeis tiktê̢) and thoughts (kai dianoêmata) in bounteous philosophy (en philosophia̢ aphthonô̢), until (heôs an), here having been strengthened (entautha rôstheis) and well developed (kai auxêtheis), he can see (katidê̢) a science which is the only one such (tina epistêmên mian toiautên), which is of beauty that is such (hê esti kalou toioude) [the ‘such’ qualifying science {toiautên} and beauty {toioude} is forward looking; it points to all that follows in this paragraph after Diotima’s call upon Socrates to focus his mind on it] – try to give me your best attention (peirô de moi ton noun prosechein hôs hoion te malista). – He who has been instructed thus far in the erotic pursuits (hos an mechri entautha pros ta erôtika paidagôgêthê̢), who has seen the beautiful in due order and in the right way (theômenos ephexês kai orthôs ta kala), coming toward the end of the erotic pursuits (pros telos êdê iôn tôn erôtikôn), will suddenly see (exaiphnês katopsetai) a nature of wondrous beauty (ti thaumaston tên phusin kalon), that beauty (touto ekeino), Socrates (ô Sôkrates), for the sake of which (hou dê heneken) all the former toils were udertaken (kai hoi emprosthen pantes ponoi êsan), which is, in the first place, everlasting (prôton men aei on), and neither coming into being (kai oute gignomenon) nor perishing (oute apollumenon), neither growing (oute auxanomenon) nor decaying (oute phthinon); secondly (epeita), not beautiful in one point of view (ou tê̢ men kalon) and foul in another (tê̢ d’ aischron) ((210d3-211a4) … but beauty itself in itself (all’ auto kath’ hauto) with itself (meth’ hautou), simple (monoeides), everlasting (aei on), of which all other beautiful things partake in some such way as this (ta de alla panta kala ekeinou metechonta tropon tina toiouton), that while all the other beautiful things are in the process of becoming and perishing (hoion gignomenôn te tôn allôn kai apollumenôn), it itself suffers no increase or diminution (mêden ekeino mête ti pleon mête elatton gignesthai), or any change (mêde paschein mêden). When someone (hotan dê tis) ascending from these earthly things by pursuing love in a right way (apo tônde dia to orthôs paiderastein epaniôn), begins to perceive that beauty (ekeino to kalon archêtai kathoran), is almost touching the end (schedon an ti haptoito tou telous).’ (211b1-7) – The end itself is undoubtedly the science/knowledge of the good.

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We can be certain that when Plato wrote the Symposium he was thinking of the Charmides. Socrates opens the Charmides with the words: ‘We’d got yesterday (Hêkomen tê̢ proteraia̢) from the camp of Potidaea (ek Poteidaias apo tou stratopedou, 153a1-2) … I was glad to return to my old haunts (hasmenôs ê̢a epi tas sunêtheis diatribas). I went to Taureas wrestling-school (kai dê kai eis tên Taureou palaistran eisêlthon, 153a2-4) … I sat down (Parakathezomenos oun), said hello to Critias (êspazomên ton te Kritian) and the others (kai tous allous), and proceeded to tell them (kai diêgoumên autois) all the news from the camp (ta apo stratopedou), answering whatever questions I was asked (ho ti me tis aneroito); and each had a different question (êrôtôn de allos allo). When we’d exhausted that subject (Epeidê de tôn toioutôn hadên eichomen) I asked them about things here (authis egô autous anêrôtôn ta tê̢de, 153c8-d3). (Translation D. Watt)

In the Charmides we learn nothing more about the camp and the battle at Potidaea, but In the Symposium Plato presents us with Alcibiades’ narrative about Socrates in the military camp, and in the battle at Potidaea in which he saved Alcibiades’ life (219e-220e).

The realization that Plato was thinking of the Charmides when he wrote the Symposium is important, yet on its own it does not answer the question whether the science/knowledge of the beauty itself in the Symposium sheds light on the science/knowledge of the good mooted in the Charmides. I think that the dating of the Charmides will help us in answering it; I shall discuss the dating of the Charmides in my next post.

Questions

Monday, June 12, 2017

4 Eros in Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium and Socrates in his Charmides, with a reference to his Phaedo

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